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COMMENT




During the past decade an overwhelming majority of jurisdic-
tions, including Montana, adopted strict tort liability in products
liability actions.' Concurrently, that majority mitigated the harsh-
ness of contributory negligence as an absolute defense by enacting
comparative negligence statutes." The resulting interaction be-
tween the doctrine of strict liability and comparative negligence is
effecting a metamorphosis in products liability law. Inevitably
Montana attorneys and the Montana Supreme Court must address
the issue being resolved by other jurisdictions: Should loss be ap-
portioned between the injured plaintiff and the manufacturer if
the plaintiff's fault and the manufacturer's defective product have
combined to produce plaintiff's injury?
II. THE RESULT OF THE INTERACTION-COMPARATIVE PRINCIPLES
4
The Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted strict products liabil-
ity in Dipple v. Sciano.5 Seemingly, considerations of fault had no
place in strict products liability actions under Section 402A.6 The
Dipple court analogized 402A actions to negligence per se 7 how-
1. Much of the analysis in this comment is based on research done in preparing
another article, Carestia, The Interaction of Comparative Negligence and Strict
Liability-Where Are We?, 47 INS. COUNSEL J. 53 (1980), which was awarded first place in
the 1979 legal writing contest sponsored by the International Association of Insurance
Counsel. This comment is an attempt to apply the principles developed in this earlier article
to Montana law.
2. Pinto, Comparative Responsibility-An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 45 INs.
COUNSEL J. 115, 116 (1978). Forty-two jurisdictions have adopted strict products liability.
3. Id. at 120. Thirty-five states have replaced the defense of contributory negligence
with comparative negligence.
4. Various terms are used to describe the recently developing concept of comparative
principles when defenses to strict products liability are invoked. These include "compara-
tive negligence," "comparative fault," "comparative cause," and "equitable apportionment
or allocation of loss." See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d 725, 732-37, 575 P.2d
1162, 1165-68, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 383-86 (1978).
5. 37 Wis.2d 443, 460, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (1967).
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
7. Dipple v. Sciano, 37 Wis.2d 443, 461, 155 N.W.2d 55, 64 (1967).
1
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ever, to apply Wisconsin's comparative negligence statute.8 The ef-
fect of Dipple is to require consumers to exercise ordinary care in
using manufacturers' products. -Correspondingly, manufacturers
have a duty not to place in the stream of commerce any product in
a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer.
For several years following Dipple, Wisconsin was the only
state to apportion damages between negligent plaintiffs and
strictly liable manufacturers of defective products. As more juris-
dictions enacted comparative negligence statutes they too began to
consider the plaintiffs negligent conduct and to apportion dam-
ages accordingly. Twelve jurisdictions now apply comparative prin-
ciples in strict products liability actions' and many other jurisdic-
tions have recently suggested the possibility of future application
of those principles.'0 A strong trend toward comparative principles
8. Id. at 464, 155 N.W.2d at 65 (Hollows, J., concurring).
9. Jurisdictions applying comparative principles are Alaska, California, Florida, Idaho,
Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, Texas, Washington, and Wis-
consin. See Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975); Sun Valley
Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976); Hagenbuch v.
Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972); Butaud v. Suburban Marine &
Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alas. 1976); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d 725,
575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So.2d 80 (Fla.
1976); Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977); Thibault v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 395 A.2d 843 (N.H. 1978); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J.
150, 402 A.2d 140 (1979); Bacelleri v. Hyster Co., 597 P.2d 351 (Or. 1978); Hamilton v.
Motor Coach Indus., Inc., 569 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. 1978); Berry v. Coleman Systems Co., 596
P.2d 1365 (Wash. App. 1979); Dipple v. Sciano, 37 Wis.2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
10. Those jurisdictions include Alabama, Connecticut, Illinois, Michigan, New York,
Utah, and Vermont. See Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So.2d 134 (Ala. 1976)
(adopted negligence per se theory of products liability and held contributory negligence ap-
plicable); Hoelter v. Mowhawk Service, Inc., 170 Conn. 495, 365 A.2d 1064 (1976) (Contribu-
tory fault which was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries barred recovery. Shortly there-
after the Connecticut legislature adopted a statute reversing the holding but was silent as to
comparative principles.); Skinner v. Reed Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill.2d 1, 374
N.E.2d 437 (1978) (The court adopted comparative contribution between defendants. Three
dissenting justices suggested that by simple logic Illinois impliedly adopted a doctrine of
comparative fault applicable to strict liability.); Kirby v. Larson, 400 Mich. 484, 256 N.W.2d
400 (1977) (In rebutting the argument that comparative negligence should not be adopted
because no-fault legislation reduced the need for it, the court suggested that comparative
negligence would be appropriate in those cases not involving no-fault such as products lia-
bility. Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976) (acci-
dent at issue occurred prior to adoption of comparative negligence, but court indicated that
comparative negligence would apply to strict liability); Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel
Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158-59 (Utah 1979) ("We need not-and do not-reach the issue here
... of whether comparative principles should apply in strict products liability cases ... to
diminish recovery by plaintiff.... "); Stannard v. Harris, 135 Vt. 544, 380 A.2d 101 (1977)
(comparative negligence applicable in a negligence and breach of warranty action against
the manufacturer). See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1763 (1962) which expressly includes
"supplying of a defective product in an unreasonably dangerous condition."
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and apportionment of damages in strict products liability actions is
evident.
III. "FAULT" IN 402A ACTIONS
In applying comparative principles a court must compare the
plaintiff's fault (culpable conduct) to the manufacturer's strict lia-
bility (placing into the stream of commerce an unreasonably dan-
gerous, defective product). The fault/strict liability comparison
and the resulting apportionment of damages have been criticized
as inconsistent with the pure concept of strict products liability.1'
That comparison, however, is proper because of the "quasi-fault"' 2
aspects of strict products liability.
The drafters of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts used the terms "defect" and "unreasonably dangerous" in
framing the 402A action. 8 The definition of "defect" includes a
"deficiency," "blemish" or "fault."' 4 Further, the Restatement
commentary on Section 402A suggests that a product is "defec-
tive" if "in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate con-
sumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him."' 5 Consumer
expectations are a function of foreseeability, and indeed manufac-
turers in many instances should foresee unreasonable dangers and
adjust their conduct to produce non-defective products. Any dis-
cussion of the 402A action, then, necessarily involves negligence
terminology and fault concepts. Dean Prosser has explained the
concept of fault as follows:
There is a broader sense in which "fault" means nothing more
than a departure from a standard of conduct required of a man
by society for the protection of his neighbors; and if the departure
is an innocent one, and the defendant cannot help it, it is none
the less a departure, and a social wrong.'
11. "The pure concept of products liability so pridefully fashioned and nurtured by
this court for the past decade and a half is reduced to a shambles." Daly v. General Motors
Corp., 20 Cal.3d 725, 757, 575 P.2d 1162, 1181, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 399 (1978) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
12. For a thorough discussion of the fault aspects of strict products liability see
Carestia, The Interaction of Comparative Negligence and Strict Products Liability-
Where are We?, 47 INS. COUNSEL J. 53, 61-64 (1980).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides:
One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate consumer, or to his property ....
14. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTioNARY (2d ed. 1961).
15. RESTATEM ENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment g (1965).
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Moreover, courts now boldly recognize the fault aspects of strict
products liability:
So viewed, the notion of fault is readily seen to be inherent in the
concept of strict liability. The manufacturer or supplier of a chat-
tel has been charged with the duty of distributing a product
which is fit, suitable and duly safe. Failure to comply with this
standard constitutes fault."
Because strict products liability is simply another form of
fault, the comparison to plaintiff's fault is proper. Further, the pol-
icies underlying strict products liability and comparative negli-
gence render that comparison essential. The policies associated
with strict products liability require a manufacturer to bear the
cost of plaintiff's injuries because the manufacturer is the better
risk bearer. 18 The policies justifying comparative negligence, how-
ever, dictate that the negligent plaintiff's loss not be shifted from
him:
[W]hen men live in society, a certain average of conduct, a sacri-
fice of individual peculiarities going beyond a certain point, is
necessary to the general welfare. His neighbors accordingly re-
quire him, at his proper peril, to come up to their standard, and
the courts which they establish decline to take his personal equa-
tion into account. 19
Should the policies justifying strict products liability exclude
from consideration those which justify comparative negligence, or
should there be a delicate balancing of both doctrines? Courts in
increasing numbers refuse to allow the strict products liability doc-
trine to excuse plaintiffs from their own negligence. Public policy
dictates that consumers be responsible for their conduct. On the
other hand, plaintiff's fault should not excuse a manufacturer from
the duty imposed by Section 402A. Instead, both plaintiff's and
manufacturer's duties should be considered in determining the
damages fairly to be born by each party. Comparative principles
properly apportion those damages based upon each party's
culpability.
IV. VARIOUS COMPARATIVE SCHEMES
Courts applying comparative principles in products liability
17. Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140, 145-46
(1979).
18. E.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962).
19. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 108 (1923).
[Vol. 41
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actions have encountered difficulty in reconciling the two seem-
ingly incongruous doctrines. Courts first applying comparative
principles engaged in semantic juggling to demonstrate that the
doctrines were compatible. 0 Their efforts produced terminology
which includes "plaintiff's misconduct," "comparative fault,"
"comparative cause," and "blameworthy conduct. 2 1
Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc.,"2 how-
ever, avoided semantic distinctions, holding that:
It is unnecessary to conceptualize the theory of the action which
strict liability creates in order for us to apply comparative negli-
gence principles to strict products liability cases which result in
personal injuries."3
The defendant is strictly liable for harm caused from his defec-
tive product, except that the award of damages shall be reduced
in proportion to the plaintiff's contribution to his injury. "'
Since Butaud courts have been less concerned with semantic preci-
sion than with fairness to both plaintiffs and defendants:
[Ojur reason for extending a full system of comparative fault to
strict products liability is because it is fair to do so. The law con-
sistently seeks to elevate justice and equity above the exact con-
tours of a mathematical equation. We are convinced that in merg-
ing the two principles what may be lost in symmetry is more than
gained in fundamental fairness."s
In overcoming semantic hurdles, however, courts adopted three
comparative schemes: (1) application of the state's comparative
negligence statute;' (2) adoption of the judicial doctrine of "com-
parative fault;' 7 and (3) adoption of the judicial doctrine of "com-
20. See Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 394 (Minn. 1977):
We find no difficulty in applying comparative concepts to products liability cases
.... [C]omparative negligence is a misnomer: "[T]he comparative negligence
statute becomes more than a comparative negligence or even a comparative fault
statute; it becomes a comparative cause statute under which all independent and
concurrent causes of an accident may be apportioned on a percentage basis." [ci-
tations omitted].
21. E.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d 725, 732-37, 575 P.2d 1162, 1165-68,
144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 383-86 (1978).
22. 555 P.2d 42 (Alas. 1976).
23. Id. at 45.
24. Id. at 45-46.
25. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d 725, 742, 575 P.2d 1162, 1172, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380, 390 (1978).
26. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So.2d 82 (Fla. 1976).
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parative causation." 8 Although the various schemes employ differ-
ent terminology and are applied differently, they all seek the same
result. An injured plaintiff will recover only those damages for
which he is not at fault; that is, a plaintiff's damages will be re-
duced to the extent that his fault was a proximate cause of his
injury. The manufacturer is liable only for the damage resulting
from the defective product. If the plaintiff's fault and the manu-
facturer's defective product are both proximate causes of the in-
jury, the loss will be apportioned.
These schemes preserve the positive aspects of both strict
products liability and comparative negligence. Society requires
consumers to meet a reasonable standard of conduct, or act at
their peril. Conversely, manufacturers act at their peril in market-
ing unreasonably dangerous, defective products. A manufacturer's
liability exposure is lessened "only to the extent that the trier finds
that the victim's conduct contributed to his injury." 9 In cases
where injured consumers were not negligent, manufacturers are
solely liable. Under comparative principles, therefore, the "incen-
tive to avoid and correct product defects, remains .... ",0
Montana's adoption of comparative principles would require
selection among the various comparative schemes. The court could
simply apply Montana's comparative negligence statute.3 Applica-
tion of the statute, however, creates serious problems. Specifically,
the statute creates an absolute defense if plaintiff's negligence is
greater than fifty percent. Where plaintiff is more at fault than
defendant, then, the statute creates the possibility of a windfall for
the manufacturer. That potential for windfalls renders the compar-
ative scheme unfair, thereby defeating the major advantage of
comparative principles. Further, jurisdictions applying compara-
tive principles disagree whether a comparative negligence statute is
properly applied in strict products liability cases.3" For example,
"[T]he [New Hampshire] comparative negligence statute. . . does
not apply to strict liability cases because it is confined by its terms
to actions for negligence."33
A few jurisdictions have embraced "comparative causation" in
apportioning the loss between negligent plaintiffs and manufactur-
28. Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843 (N.H. 1978).
29. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d 725, 737, 575 P.2d 1162, 1169, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380, 387 (1978).
30. Id.
31. MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED (hereinafter cited as MCA] § 27-1-702 (1979).
32. Compare Dipple v. Sciano, 37 Wis.2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967) with Thibault v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, (N.H. 1978).
33. Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 846 (N.H. 1978).
[Vol. 41
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ers of defective products.38 Analysis of comparative causation nev-
ertheless reveals serious shortcomings. Under this scheme, the loss
to be born by each party is a function of the degree to which plain-
tiff's negligence and defendant's defect proximately caused the in-
jury. Yet "proximate cause" is a concept with no readily identifi-
able meaning or method of application. Dean Prosser describes
proximate cause as "all things to all men."3 5
Having no integrated meaning of its own, its chameleon quality
permits it to be substituted for any one of the elements of a negli-
gence case when decision on that element becomes difficult ...
no other formula has found so much affection in the chambers of
final authority; none other so nearly does the work of Alladin's
lamp.3
6
Proximate cause "unnecessarily creates confusion and complex-
ity 87 and is simply not amenable to comparisons of degree. More-
over, for comparative causation to validly apportion the loss, the
causes under consideration must bear a functional relationship to
fault.38 Comparative causation, therefore, is simply comparative
fault in a confusing and complex disguise."
Pure comparative fault is the preferable comparative scheme.
The pure system minimizes the potential for windfalls. The manu-
facturer will not be absolved of liability unless the plaintiff is to-
tally at fault for the injury; conversely, only if the plaintiff is with-
out fault will the manufacturer be totally liable. Moreover, fault is
more easily comprehended by jurors and less subject to judicial
abuse than proximate cause. Comparative fault, then, is the proper
comparative scheme because it focuses directly on each party's
wrong, and asks a jury to apportion the loss in a familiar, manage-
able fashion.'0
34. See Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho
1976); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843 (N.H. 1978); General Motors Corp. v.
Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
35. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 42, at 246 (4th ed. 1971).
36. Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEx. L. REv. 471, 471-72
(1950).
37. Id. at 490.
38. Fischer, Products Liability-Applicability of Comparative Negligence, 43 Mo. L.
REV. 431, 445 (1978).
39. For an in-depth discussion of the failings of comparative causation see Carestia,
supra note 11, at 64-68.
40. Justice Clark, concurring in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d at 748, 575
P.2d at 1176, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 394, convincingly disposed of the argument that comparative
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V. MONTANA-CURRENT STATUS
The Montana Supreme Court in Brown v. North American
Manufacturing Co.4 1 spoke peripherally to the issue of contribu-
tory negligence in strict products liability cases. The plaintiff in
Brown lost his leg in a defectively designed Grain-O-Vator. During
pre-trial proceedings the defendant asserted contributory negli-
gence as a defense. The trial court, however, struck the contribu-
tory negligence issue from the case. That ruling was not appealed,
and therefore the supreme court did not speak to whether plain-
tiff's fault in the form of contributory negligence could be a dam-
age-reducing factor in a strict products liability action. The Brown
court simply did not have the issue of comparative principles
before it.
The court did speak directly to the issue of assumption of risk:
"Henceforth, in product liability cases the defense of assumption
of risk, will be based on a subjective standard rather than that of
the reasonable man test. '42 In embracing comment n of Section
402A, as it relates to assumption of risk,'43 the court generally re-
ferred to contributory negligence:
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when
such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect
in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence.
On the other hand the form of contributory negligence which con-
sists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a
known danger, and commonly passes under the name of assump-
tion of risk . . . bars recover. 4"
At best the court's discussion of comment n permits the inference
that plaintiffs are not to be penalized under Montana law for
merely failing to discover a defect or guard against the possibility
of a defect. Further, as a prelude to its discussion of comment n,
the court stated that strict liability is "not. . . absolutely immune
to considerations of plaintiff's conduct."' 5
The only other consideration regarding contributory negli-
gence relates to the trial court Instruction No. 10, an instruction
not on contributory negligence but assumption of risk:
You are instructed that assumption of risk is voluntarily placing
41. - Mont. - 576 P.2d 711, 711 (1978).
42. Id. at -, 576 P.2d at 719.
43. "We find the above standard of conduct of the plaintiff as related to the injury
must be considered under the Montana case law on the assumption of risk when applied to
strict liability cases." Id. (emphasis added).
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965).
45. __ Mont. -, 576 P.2d at 719.
[Vol. 41
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oneself in a position to chance known hazards. If a person has
assumed the risk, he cannot recover for any injury or damage sus-
tained by him. In determining whether or not the plaintiff as-
sumed a risk you are not to consider whether or not the plaintiff
exercised due care for his own safety .... "
This instruction was drawn from the Montana Jury Instruction
Guide but was modified by the language "you are not to consider
whether or not the plaintiff exercised due care for his own safety."
The court found the modified instruction, when considered as a
whole, to be an accurate statement of Montana law, but disap-
proved the instruction's use in future cases because "it improperly
inserts into the case elements of contributory negligence that could
cause jury confusion. '4 7 Certainly the court wanted to prevent a
future jury from confusing contributory negligence and assumption
of risk. That confusion could result in improperly barring plaintiff
from recovery based only upon contributory negligence.
Chief Justice Haswell in a specially concurring opinion also
briefly addressed contributory negligence as it relates to assump-
tion of risk and Instruction No. 10: "As pointed out in the majority
opinion contributory negligence is not a defense . . . but assump-
tion of risk is a complete bar to recovery . ",. " With this state-
ment the Chief Justice reaffirmed the court's decision to embrace
comment n. Again, comment n precludes any consideration of
plaintiff's mere failure to discover a defect or guard against the
possibility of a defect. Chief Justice Haswell further emphasized
that assumption of risk is not to be determined by contributory
negligence standards; therefore, whether a plaintiff's assumption of
the risk is "unreasonable" is not a proper consideration.4" To dis-
cern more from Brown respecting contributory negligence and
comparative principles is to elevate conjecture to the level of
precedent.
VI. MONTANA-A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY
The effect of plaintiff's conduct constituting fault, which goes
beyond a mere failure to discover or guard against a defect, is yet
to be delineated by the court. Comparative principles provide the
best mechanism for considering plaintiff's fault including, for ex-
ample, contributory negligence and misuse. Even the defense of as-
46. Id. at , 576 P.2d at 720.
47. Id. at -, 576 P.2d at 721.
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sumption of risk is best applied via a comparative scheme. Baccel-
leri v. Hyster Co.50 demonstrated the advantage of comparative
principles regarding defenses in strict products liability actions:
[Clontributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and other de-
fenses overlap and a plaintiff's conduct may often be character-
ized in a number of ways .... 51
We hold that conduct which was sometimes labeled assumption
of the risk but which is a subspecies of contributory negligence
can be compared in the apportionment of damages. . . and that
comparative fault is applicable in strict liability in tort.2
No court, however well intentioned, can correctly categorize
plaintiff's fault in every case as either contributory negligence, mis-
use, or assumption of the risk. Moreover, defendant's and plain-
tiff's fate should not turn on a semantic distinction which may re-
sult either in an absolute defense or an absolute bar to asserting a
defense. Absolute defenses produce windfalls for manufacturers;
elimination of defenses produces windfalls for plaintiffs. Receipt of
a windfall is unfair, and the primary advantage of a comparative
scheme is its focus on fairness to plaintiffs, manufacturers, and
consumers.
5 3
Montana is in an advantageous position respecting the devel-
opment of comparative principles. Because the issue of compara-
tive principles was not before the Brown court, and because the
discussion of contributory negligence in Brown is peripheral to the
assumption of risk holding, 4 the court can adopt comparative
principles without upsetting prior law. The court can gain substan-
tial insight into the comparative schemes simply by looking to the
well-reasoned, recent opinions of other jurisdictions.55 The adop-
tion of comparative fault by the California Supreme Court, a court
with a history of persuasive precedent in tort law, underscores the
credence of comparative principles. Further, the Uniform Compar-
ative Fault Act "[wihile lacking any legislative sanction. . . points
in the direction of a responsible national trend."56 The act was
adopted by the National Conference of the Commissioners on Uni-
50. 287 Or. 3, 597 P.2d 351 (1979).
51. Id. at , 597 P.2d at 354.
52. Id. at , 597 P.2d at 354-55.
53. E.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr.
380 (1978); Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alas. 1976);
West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
54. See text accompanying notes 40-48 supra.
55. See note 8 supra.
56. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d 725, 741-42, 575 P.2d 1162, 1172, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380, 390 (1978).
278 [Vol. 41
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form State Laws after several years of discussion and analysis by
various committees of the conference.57 Also, the apparent major-
ity of scholarly commentators has urged the adoption of compara-
tive principles in strict products liability cases.58 Furthermore, the
United States Department of Commerce, Interagency Task Force
on Product Liability, has recommended the application of compar-
ative principles in products liability actions to relieve "some of the
inequities incurred by both plaintiffs and defendants as a result of
an 'all or nothing' approach to recovery.
59
A combined reading of these authorities suggests the following
framework for evaluating plaintiff's conduct in a products liability
setting:
1. That the court adopt a pure system of comparative fault."
2. That the court reduce plaintiff's damage award commen-
surate with plaintiff's fault.
3. That plaintiff's fault constitute that conduct commonly re-
ferred to as contributory negligence, 61 misuse or abnormal use, or
assumption of the risk.
57. For a thorough discussion of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act see Wade, Prod-
ucts Liability and Plaintiffs Fault-The Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 29 MERCER L.
REV. 373 (1978).
58. See, e.g., Brewster, Comparative Negligence in Strict Liability Cases, 42 J. AIR L.
107, 117-18 (1976); Epstein, Products Liability: Defenses Based on Plaintiff's Conduct, 68
UTAH L. REV. 267, 284 (1968); Feinberg, The Applicability of a Comparative Negligence
Defense in a Strict Liability Suit Based on Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts, 2d,
42 INS. COUNSEL J. 39, 52 (1975); Fischer, Products Liability-Applicability of Comparative
Negligence, 43 Mo. L. REV. 431, 433 (1978); Fisher, Nugent & Lewis, Comparative Negli-
gence: An Exercise in Applied Justice, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 655, 674 (1974); Fleming, The
Supreme Court of California 1974-1975-Forward: Comparative Negligence at Last-By
Judicial Choice, 64 CAL. L. REV. 239, 268-71 (1976); Freedman, The Comparative Negli-
gence Doctrine Under Strict Liability: Defendant's Conduct Becomes Another "Proximate
Cause" of Injury, Damage or Loss, 175 INS. L.J. 468, 479 (1975); Levine, Buyer's Conduct as
Affecting the Extent of Manufacturer's Liability in Warranty, 52 MINN. L. REV. 627, 656-
57 (1968); Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assump-
tion of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93, 115-19 (1972); Pinto, Comparative Responsibility-An
Idea Whose Time Has Come, 45 INS, COUNSEL J. 115, 127 (1978); Robinson, Square Pegs
(Products Liability) in Round Holes (Comparative Negligence), 52 CALIF. ST. B.J. 16
(1977); Schwartz, Pure Comparative Negligence in Action, 34 AM. TRIAL J. 117, 128-31
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59. 2 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTS LIABIL-
ITY: FINAL REPORT ON THE LEGAL STUDY 116 (1977).
60. The Montana scheme should be similar to that suggested by the Uniform Compar-
ative Fault Act and to that adopted by California.
61. Plaintiff's fault should exclude the mere failure to discover or guard against a de-
fect. A flagrant lack of ordinary care in discovering a defect, however, should constitute
plaintiff's fault and reduce plaintiff's award. A lack of ordinary care respecting plaintiff's use
of the produce should also constitute plaintiff's fault, as should assumption of the risk.
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4. That comparative fault in Montana operate in accordance
with the following instructions:
(1) Was defendant's product in a defective condition unrea-
sonably dangerous to the user or consumer when placed in the
stream of commerce? (If the answer is "no," you need go no
further.)
(2) Was the defect a proximate cause of the injury? (If the
answer is "no," you need go no further.)
(3) Was there any plaintiff's fault?
(4) Was plaintiff's fault, if any, a proximate cause of the
injury?
(5) Taking the combined fault of the defendant and the
plaintiff that proximately caused the injury as a total of 100%,




This framework implements not only the policies justifying
strict products liability but also the positive social aspects of our
negligence system. Moreover, it minimizes the potential for wind-
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